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Among many objects around us, some are more salient than others (i.e., attract our
attention automatically). Some objects may be inherently salient (e.g., brighter), while
others may become salient by virtue of their ecological relevance through experience.
However, the role of ecological experience in automatic attention has not been studied
systematically. To address this question, we let subjects (macaque monkeys) view a
large number of complex objects (>300), each experienced repeatedly (>5 days) with
rewarding, aversive or no outcome association (mere-perceptual exposure). Test of
salience was done on separate days using free viewing with no outcome. We found that
gaze was biased among the objects from the outset, affecting saccades to objects or
fixations within objects. When the outcomewas rewarding, gaze preference was stronger
(i.e., positive) for objects with larger or equal but uncertain rewards. The effects of aversive
outcomes were variable. Gaze preference was positive for some outcome associations
(e.g., airpuff), but negative for others (e.g., time-out), possibly due to differences in threat
levels. Finally, novel objects attracted gaze, but mere perceptual exposure of objects
reduced their salience (learned negative salience). Our results show that, in primates,
object salience is strongly influenced by previous ecological experience and is supported
by a large memory capacity. Owing to such high capacity for learned salience, the ability
to rapidly choose important objects can grow during the entire life to promote biological
fitness.
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INTRODUCTION
Attention can be used to actively search for and focus on something important (top-down
attention). However, attention can also work passively in a more automatic fashion (e.g.,
bottom-up). For example, attention can be passively attracted by something bright, colorful
or moving, which largely represents its physical features (physical salience). Attention is also
automatically attracted to delicious foods (Nijs et al., 2010), erotic images (Lykins et al., 2006),
faces (Hershler and Hochstein, 2005; Theeuwes and Van Der Stigchel, 2006), emotional expressions
(Mogg and Bradley, 1999), and feared animals (Ohman et al., 2001), which represent ecological
features. However, in such cases, the origin of salience (i.e., attentional bias) is often unclear. It can
be present intrinsically, originate from past experience, or both combined (learned vs. intrinsic).
In order to reveal the neural mechanisms of salience, it is critical to dissociate the different origins
experimentally.
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As the first step to address this question, we devised a learning
procedure in which individual visual objects acquired different
kinds and levels of salience through long-term experience. We let
subjects (macaque monkeys) view many abstract fractal objects,
each associated with a particular outcome or no outcome. Since
monkeys had never seen these fractals, the ecological aspect
of salience was created from scratch and fully controlled. Our
experiments thus focused on “learned ecological salience.”
We considered three ecological dimensions: appetitive,
aversive, and perceptual (Figure 1A). The appetitive dimension
represents ecological outcomes that are desirable and promote
approach (e.g., food seeking), while aversive dimension includes
undesirable or dangerous outcomes that should be avoided (e.g.,
escaping from a predator). We further divided appetitive and
aversive experiences depending on how the appetitive outcome
was delivered and what kinds of aversive stimuli were delivered
(sub-dimensions). For the third dimension, we perceptually
exposed objects with no appetitive or aversive outcomes.We then
contrasted these familiar objects with completely novel objects,
which also did not predict any outcome to test the effect of
mere-perceptual exposure.
We hypothesized that long-term experience along any of these
dimensions should change object salience as measured by free
gaze behavior. To test this hypothesis, we simply let subjects freely
view the fractal objects following training. Orienting of gaze
(eye movement) usually reflects orienting of attention (Rizzolatti
et al., 1987; Motter and Belky, 1998), and can be called “overt
attention” (Posner, 1980). Therefore, this free viewing procedure
allows “free attention” to be measured. Biases in free viewing
would reflect object salience in the absence of explicit task
goals. To this end, we set two conditions for testing. First,
objects and behavior did not predict any outcome during free
viewing. Subjects were well-practiced in free viewing to know the
absence of contingency. Second, the free viewing procedure was
performed on separate days (>1 day) following the last learning
session.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
General Procedures
Four adult rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used for the
experiments (monkeys B, R, D male, and U female). All animal
care and experimental procedures were approved by the National
Eye Institute Animal Care andUse Committee and complied with
the Public Health Service Policy on the humane care and use of
laboratory animals. Monkeys were implanted with a head-post
for fixation and scleral search coils to monitor eye movements
prior to training in the tasks.
Stimuli
For fractal stimuli, we used four point-symmetrical polygons
that were overlaid around a common center such that smaller
polygons were positioned more toward the front. The parameters
that determined each polygon (size, edges, color, etc.) were
chosen randomly (Miyashita et al., 1991; Yamamoto et al.,
2012). Fractal sizes were on average ∼7◦ × 7◦ but ranged
from 5 to 10 degrees. Use of abstract fractals avoided previous
perceptual exposures or appetitive/aversive associations that are
common when using naturalistic stimuli and offered us complete
control over object history for each subject. Furthermore, the
fractal generation method allowed us to systematically create
a large number of distinct fractal objects with recognizable
variations in visual shapes and colors to test the memory
capacity for previously experienced objects. The large number
of fractals used per subject and their random assignment
to various groups (below) also prevented possible differences
in physical salience to systematically affect our findings. For
face stimuli, we used 40 frontal conspecific monkey faces
∼8◦ in size. Each monkey was familiarized with 8 faces
(different for each monkey). The 32 remaining faces were
novel and were used in novel vs. familiar free viewing (details
below).
Behavioral Procedures
Behavioral tasks were controlled by a custom VC++ based
software “Blip” (http://www.simonhong.org). Data acquisition
and output control was performed using National Instruments
NI-PCIe 6353. The monkeys sat in a primate chair with their
head fixed facing a screen 30 cm in front of them. Stimuli
generated by an active-matrix liquid crystal display projector
(PJ550, ViewSonic) were rear-projected on the screen. Diluted
apple juice was used as reward. Rewards amounts could be
either small (0.08 and 0.1ml for monkeys B, D and monkeys
R, U, respectively) or large (0.21 and 0.35ml for monkeys B,
D and monkey R, U, respectively). Eye position was sampled
at 1 kHz.
The behavioral procedure consisted of three tasks: saccade
task, pavlovian task, and free viewing task. Saccade task was used
to train object-reward and object-reward uncertainty association.
Pavlovian task was used to train aversive sets that included
rewarding, aversive, and neutral objects. Free viewing task was
used to create object familiarity (fractal or face). Free viewing task
was also used in all dimensions for measuring gaze bias between
objects.
Saccade Task
We used an object-directed saccade task to train object value
and risk associations for a set of fractals (Figure 1B, left). Trials
started by the appearance of a central fixation dot. Following a
variable fixation interval of 900 ± 200ms, one of the fractals
in the set appeared on the screen at one of the eight peripheral
locations (eccentricity 15◦). After an overlap period of 400ms,
fixation dot disappeared and the animal was required to make a
saccade. Outcome was delivered after 500 ± 100ms of fixating
the fractal. This initiated inter-trial intervals (ITI) of 1250 ±
250ms with a blank screen. All fractals were shown for the
same duration after fixation regardless of reward outcome to
ensure equal perceptual exposure. In the reward amount group
(Figure 3A), outcome was small reward for half of fractals and
large reward for the other half (4 low and 4 high reward fractals
in a set). For the graded reward group (Figure 3D), outcome
consisted of 5 grades of linearly increasing reward amounts from
small to large (5 fractals in a set). In the reward uncertainty group
(Figure 4A), outcome was medium reward for half of fractals
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm and measures of learned salience. (A) Subjects (macaque monkeys) viewed fractal objects in three ecological dimensions
(appetitive, aversive, and perceptual) and their sub-dimensions. (B) Ecological learning and salience test. Procedures used for learning: Saccade task (appetitive),
Pavlovian task (aversive), Free viewing (perceptual, not shown). The learning for each object lasted for more than 5 days. Free viewing in the absence of outcome was
used to test the salience of individual objects in each sub-dimension. (C) Example of gaze trajectory composed of saccades and object fixations during a single free
viewing trial (3 s). Eye position is shown by time-dependent color-coded dots (2ms/sample, from orange: display onset to blue: display offset). (D) The time course of
gaze during the same free viewing. Three metrics were used to quantify object salience: first saccade, object scanning and view duration (see Figure 3).
and for the other half either small or large reward with equal
probability (4 low and 4 high risk in a set). For the graded reward
probability group (Figure 4D), outcome consisted of 5 grades
of linearly increasing probabilities of receiving the large reward
(0, 25, 50, 75, and 100%, 5 fractals in a set). Breaking fixation
or a premature saccade to fractal resulted in an error tone and
the same trial was repeated (<10% of trials). A correct trial was
followed by another tone. Each training session consisted of 80
trials for a given set during which each fractal was presented
10 times (16 times for graded amount and probability sets) in a
pseudorandom order.
Pavlovian Task
We used a pavlovian task to train aversive associations with
a set of objects (Figure 1B, left). The main difference between
this task and saccade task was that subjects were not required
to fixate fractals to receive outcome during the pavlovian task.
The rational for using the saccade task in reward and risk
dimension was that it gives better control over perceptual
exposure and foveation duration for each object. However, for
aversive training, the requirement to fixate aversive objects would
be impractical. In order to motivate our animals during aversive
training, rewarding objects were also included in the aversive
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set along with aversive and neutral objects (Figure 2). All trials
were preceded by an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1250 ± 250ms
with a blank screen. After this, a fractal was shown randomly
at one of 5 locations (4 radial, eccentricity 15◦ + center) for
500 ± 100ms. Afterwards, the fractal was extinguished and the
corresponding outcome was delivered. Neutral objects did not
lead to any outcome. Reward objects resulted in a large reward.
Airpuff objects resulted in 100 ms of 8-psi airpuff delivered to
the right eye. The puff spout was positioned ∼5 cm away from
the temporal side of the eye. Tastant objects resulted in delivery
of aversive taste whose volume was equal to the small reward.
As aversive taste, normal saline was used for monkeys B and R
and quinine (0.003M Quinine HCl, Sigma-Aldrich) was used for
monkeys D andU. Timeout objects resulted in an 8 s delay to start
of the ITI. The ITI for timeout set was reduced to 750 ± 250ms
to enhance impact of this 8 s timeout. All aversive sets consisted
of 8 fractals with 4 neutral, 2 aversive, and 2 rewarding objects
(Figure 2, Table 1).
Choice Trials
To measure relative object value, choice trials between different
fractal types within a set was included in separate sessions of
saccade task or pavlovian task. Choice trials were similar to
regular saccade task trials, except that two fractals were presented
at the diametrically opposite positions. The animal was required
to make a saccade to one of the targets and fixate it to get the
outcome associated with that object. For the aversive sets, the
animal was allowed to make multiple saccades before finally
committing to one object within 3 s. This strategy was taken to
give monkeys enough time to make their final decision and not
be penalized for initial saccade.
Free Viewing Task
Each free viewing session consisted of 15 trials with fractals
chosen from one set of fractals. In any given trial, four fractals
would be randomly chosen from a set (normally 8 objects except
for graded amount set with 5 objects) and shown in one of the
two spatial configurations (diamond or square) with 15 degrees
eccentricity from the center of screen (Figure 1B, right). Location
and identity of fractals shown in a trial would be chosen at
random. For example, in the high/low reward free viewing, a
given trial could have anywhere between 0 and 4 high reward
objects shown in any of the four corners of an imaginary diamond
or square around center. Fractals were displayed for 3 s during
which the subjects could look at (or ignore) the displayed fractals.
There was no behavioral outcome for free viewing behavior.
After 3 s of viewing, the fractals would disappear. The initial
eye location prior to display onset was unconstrained in order
to create more contrast between free-viewing and the saccade
task, where saccade after fixation was rewarded. Due to equal
probability of objects appearing in a given location and the large
number of trials per animal, the initial eye location could not
affect our results systematically. Once fractals were turned off
and following a delay of 600 ± 100 ms, a white fixation dot
would appear in a one of nine random locations in the screen
(center or eight radial directions). Monkeys were then required
to make a saccade to the dot and maintain fixation (1 s) to
obtain reward. This reward was not contingent on free viewing
behavior and was included to maintain arousal. An ITI of 1250
± 250 ms with a blank screen preceded next display onset with 4
fractals.
Data Analysis
Data analysis and statistic tests were done using MATLAB 2014b
using custom written software. Gaze locations were analyzed in
an automated fashion and saccades (displacements >0.5◦) vs.
stationary periods were separated in a given trial (Figure 1D,
example trial). Objects were considered to be fixated when gaze
was within a 10 degrees window of their center with a stationary
period present. Three gaze metrics were used to quantify object
FIGURE 2 | Fractals experienced along various dimensions by a single subject (monkey U) with fractal numbers summarized in Table 1. Not shown here
are fractals used for reward gradient (Figure 3D, n = 15), reward probability (Figure 4D, n = 15), 45-trial free viewing (Figure 8C, n = 72), and novel fractals
(Figure 6A, n = 32) as well as face stimuli (Figure 6D, n = 40). HR, high reward; LR, low reward; U, uncertain reward; C, certain reward; R, reward; A, aversive
(airpuff, aversive taste, or timeout); N, neutral (no outcome). For perceptual dimension (right), eight fractals were experienced in free viewing with no outcome so that
they became familiar objects. All subjects experienced the same number of fractals.
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salience. (1) Percentage of first saccade to a given object following
the display onset (chance level: 25% in our free viewing with
4 objects). (2) Object scanning rate: total number of saccades
within an object over the viewing duration of that object. (3) View
duration: total time spent viewing a given object divided by the
total trial time of 3 s. For 2D plots of individual subject data (first
saccade vs. scanning rate and first saccade vs. view duration),
the effect of training on each metric was quantified using the
area under the receiver operating characteristic (auROC). The
auROC values for eachmeasure and each subject was then plotted
TABLE 1 | Number of objects used in various ecological dimensions per
monkey.
Appetitive sets: Aversive sets: Perceptual sets:
Reward high-low: 72 × 2* Aversive: 18 Fractals: 44
High: 36 × 2 Airpuff: 6 Familiar: 8
Low: 36 × 2 Bad taste: 6 Novel: 36
Reward graded amount: 15 Time-out: 6 Faces: 40
Reward uncertainty: 48 Reward: 18 Familiar: 8
Uncertain: 24 Neutral: 36 Novel: 32
Certain: 24
Reward graded probability: 15
Total fractals: 338 Total faces: 40
Experienced: 302 Novel: 36 Experienced: 8 Novel: 32
*72 objects Figures 3A–C, 72 objects Figures 8C,D.
against each other (e.g., Figure 3C). For the graded reward or
probability groups, the slopes of gaze metrics as a function of
expected reward amount was calculated with positive slopes
indicating increasing gaze bias as function of reward amount
(Figures 3F,4F). For the reward probability group, the level of
reward uncertainty (variance) was added as a second regressor
(Figure 4H).
Blink Detection
Blinks were detected using the stereotypical deflections in the eye
signals recorded using the eye coil signal. Blinks cause multiple
peaks in the velocity profile and are detectable even during a
saccade in both humans and monkeys (Collewijn et al., 1985;
Goossens and Van Opstal, 2000). Detection of multiple peaks in
close proximity of each other (20–100 ms, minimum peak height
and prominence: 200◦ and 50◦/sec, respectively) was taken to
indicate presence of 1 blink. We validated this blink detection
methodology in one session with simultaneous use of infrared
camera for blink detection (EyeLink 1000 Plus). The specificity
and sensitivity of our method were >90 and >80%, respectively.
Thus, blink detection can be done with relatively high confidence
using the eye coil data.
Statistical Test and Significance Levels
Two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with ecological factor
(e.g., low or high reward) as fixed effect and subjects as
random effect was done for all gaze metrics reported (e.g.,
Figure 3B). For trial by trial changes in gaze metrics, two-
way ANOVA with ecological factor and trial number as fixed
FIGURE 3 | Positive learned salience of appetitive objects: reward amount. (A–C) Effects of large and small reward. (A) Example set of 8 objects. They were
associated with low or high reward during learning, but not during salience test (free viewing). (B) Three measures of gaze bias. First Saccade: percentage of the first
saccade directed from outside to inside object. Object Scanning: rate of within-object saccades. View Duration: total trial time during which gaze stayed inside object.
See Figure 1D. These measures were averaged for high- and low-reward objects separately (n = 36 viewing sessions). (C) Gaze bias of individual subjects, shown by
area under receiver operating characteristics (auROC). Error bar indicates 95% confidence interval. (D) Example set of 5 objects which were associated with a linear
gradient of reward amount. (E) Three measures of gaze bias were averaged separately for the 5 different levels of reward amount. The statistical difference between
highest and lowest reward levels compared with the three middle reward levels (Bonferroni post-hoc) are marked for significance (n = 24 viewing sessions). (F) Gaze
bias of individual subjects, shown by the slope of a linear fit to gaze metrics as a function of reward amount. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 4 | Positive learned salience of appetitive objects: reward uncertainty. (A–C) Same format as in Figures 3A–C for effects of reward uncertainty. (n =
24 viewing sessions). (D) Example set of 5 objects which were associated with a linear gradient of large reward probability, P(HR). (E) Three measures of gaze bias
were averaged separately for the 5 different levels of reward probability (top plot). The statistical difference between reward probabilities (hsd post-hoc) are marked for
significance (n = 24 viewing sessions). Subtraction of gaze bias in reward amount sets from reward probability (bottom plot, black lines) shows enhancement of
salience by uncertainty for midlevel reward probabilities (significant differences from zero are marked). (F) Same format as Figure 3F but showing gaze bias slope as a
function of reward probability for individual subjects. (G) Same format as (E) top but when objects were grouped by 3 different levels of reward variance (P(HR) = [0,1]
with 0, P(HR) = [0.25,0.75] with 0.18 and P(HR) = 0.5 with 0.25 reward variance). The statistical differences between reward variances (hsd post-hoc) are marked for
significance. (H) Same format as (F) but showing gaze bias slope for uncertainty levels for individual subjects. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
effects including the interaction term were used (Figures 7,
8). For dependence of novelty bias on display condition (1
novel/3 familiar etc), two-way ANOVA with ecological factor
and display condition as fixed effects were used (Figure 9). Post-
hoc tests were done using Tukey’s “hsd” (honestly significant
difference, unless stated otherwise). Error-bars in all plots
show standard error of the mean (SEM), except for 2D plots
of individual subject data (e.g., Figure 3C) where error-bars
show 95% confidence interval. Significance thresholds for all
tests in this study was p < 0.05. ∗<0.05, ∗∗<0.01, ∗∗∗<0.001
(two-sided).
RESULTS
We studied ecological dimensions and sub-dimensions one at a
time. For each monkey (n= 4 monkeys B, D, R, and U), different
sets of fractals were used for different dimensions. Within a given
dimension, fractals were randomly assigned to different values
along that dimension (Figure 2, Table 1). Previous studies in
our laboratory suggest that changing object salience may require
multiple days (>5 days) of training and may rely on different
neural mechanisms compared with short-term flexible object
outcome pairing (Yasuda et al., 2012; Kim and Hikosaka, 2013;
Kim et al., 2015). We thus used long-term learning procedures
(>5 daily sessions, >50 times of viewing for each object) to
accumulate many exposures in each dimension for each object
(Figure 1B, left).
After the long-term learning period, we started examining
the monkey’s gaze bias among the fractal objects using a free
viewing task (Figure 1B, right). In each trial, four fractal objects
were chosen randomly and presented at symmetric positions
for 3 s and the monkey looked around freely. After the objects
appeared, the gaze quickly jumped onto one object (i.e., large
saccade to object), fixated within the object, scanned it (i.e.,
small saccades within the object), and jumped to another object
(Figures 1C,D). We therefore used various independent metrics
to quantify the gaze dynamics for each object: (1) percentage of
the first saccade to the object, (2) rate of scanning saccades within
the object, and (3) percentage of viewing time for each object in a
trial.
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Learned Salience of Appetitive Objects
We performed two experiments to examine the effects of reward
value and reward uncertainty (risk) separately.
Reward Value
During the long-term learning, half of the fractals were associated
with a small amount of apple juice (low value), while the other
half were associated with a large amount of apple juice (high
value). On each trial, themonkeymade a saccade to the presented
fractal object and kept fixating it until the reward was delivered
(Figure 1B, saccade task). Therefore, the perceptual exposure was
equal between the high- and low-valued objects. Each monkey
experienced 9 sets of fractals (72 objects: 36 high-reward, 36
low-reward; Table 1).
On a separate day after the last learning session, gaze
preference was tested in the free viewing task using a set of 8
objects (Figure 3A). Free viewing results showed a robust gaze
preference for high-reward objects [Figure 3B, 9 sessions per
monkey, F(1, 67) > 89, p < 0.001 all metrics]. The first saccade
after the object appearance was strongly biased toward a high-
reward compared to low-reward object (First Saccade). High
reward objects were scannedmore frequently with small saccades
(Object Scanning). Overall, high reward objects were viewed
longer than low reward objects (View Duration). These results
were common among all four subjects (Figure 3C).
We then asked whether different reward amounts determined
different grades of salience. We used new fractal objects and
divided them into five levels of linearly graded reward amounts
(Figure 3D, example set). Each monkey experienced 3 sets
of objects (15 objects, Table 1, not shown in Figure 2). Gaze
preference tended to increase with the reward amount in all
three metrics (Figure 3E, 6 sessions per monkey) and for all
subjects (Figure 3F, positive slopes). The average gaze preference
among the three intermediate reward amounts was lower and
higher than the preference for the highest and lowest amounts,
respectively [F(1, 91) > 6 for all significant differences).
Reward Uncertainty
During the long-term learning, half of the fractals were associated
with a medium amount of apple juice (certain), while the other
half were associated with a small or large amount of apple juice
(uncertain; Figure 4A). Thus, the expected reward amount (i.e.,
value) was the same between the two groups. Each monkey
experienced 6 sets of fractals (48 objects: 24 certain, 24 uncertain;
Table 1) during the saccade task (Figure 1B).
Free viewing results showed gaze preference for uncertain
objects (6 sessions per monkey). Statistical difference was present
for the first saccade after the object appearance and scanning
saccades within objects [Figure 4B, F(1, 43) > 22]. Viewing
duration showed no significant difference between uncertain
and certain objects [F(1, 43) = 2.25, p = 0.14], possibly due to
larger inter-subject variability (Figure 4C). The gaze preference
for uncertain objects was accompanied for choice preference
for uncertain objects. When two objects (certain and uncertain
objects) were presented in choice trials (see Section Materials
and Methods), subjects tended to choose the uncertain object
by making a saccade to it (>79% all monkeys) to receive the
associated outcome. This behavior is consistent with previous
reports of risk-seeking in monkeys (McCoy and Platt, 2005).
These results suggest that reward uncertainty increases object
salience independent of the associated reward size. If so,
uncertain objects with low-rewards may have a salience similar to
high-reward objects. To test this hypothesis, we used new fractal
objects associated with a linearly graded probability of small or
large reward (Figure 4D, example set). Eachmonkey experienced
3 sets of objects (15 objects, Table 1, not shown in Figure 2).
The expected reward values associated with these objects were
linearly distributed, which was the same as the objects with the
graded reward amounts (Figure 3D). But they were associated
with reward uncertainty, unlike the amount group objects. The
uncertainty was highest for the objects with equal probabilities
(50%) of the large and small rewards.
Free viewing data (Figure 4E) showed higher salience for
objects with higher reward probability as expected [main effect
of probability F(4, 112) > 8.6, P < 0.001] in all subjects
(Figure 4F, positive slopes). However, the data suggested a
boost in salience of objects with reward uncertainty (Figure 4E)
compared to objects with no reward uncertainty (Figure 3E).
This was confirmed by taking the difference between these
two sets of data [Figure 4E bottom, t(46) > 2 for significant
differences]. This boost was more evident in the first saccade
and object scanning, consistent with data in Figure 4B. Notably,
the first saccade bias toward objects with 75% large reward was
stronger than objects with 100% large reward (Figure 4E). To
further quantity the effect of graded uncertainty on salience,
we grouped the reward probability objects (Figure 4D) by
reward variance instead of reward value (Figure 4E). The
results indicate that uncertain objects had higher salience
[Figure 4G, main effect of uncertainty F(2, 114) > 4.1, P <
0.05] in all subjects (Figure 4H, positive slopes), although the
effect was unclear between the two high levels of uncertainty
(0.18 vs. 0.25). Thus in contrast with the salience of graded
reward amount objects which showed clear difference between
high and intermediate reward amounts (Figure 3E), the effect
of uncertainty induced salience may be saturated at higher
levels.
Positive or Negative Learned Salience of
Aversive Objects
We examined three kinds of aversive outcomes independently:
(1) airpuff directly delivered to the eye (Figure 5A), (2) aversive
tastes (saline in monkeys B and R, quinine in monkeys D and
U) delivered into the mouth (Figure 5D), and (3) 8 s time-
out (Figure 5G). These outcomes have been used previously to
study the short-term effects of aversiveness in decision making
(Rolls, 2000; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Morrison and
Salzman, 2011; Leathers and Olson, 2012). In contrast, we
studied the long-term effects of aversive association on object
salience.
To study these three outcomes independently, fractals were
divided into three groups. Each group contained three kinds of
fractals which were associated with: (1) aversive outcome, (2)
apple juice (reward), and (3) none (neutral). Rewarding objects
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FIGURE 5 | Positive and negative learned salience of aversive objects. (A–C) Effects of air puff. (D–F) Effects of aversive taste. (G–I) Effects of timeout. Same
format as in Figures 3A–C (n = 30 free viewing sessions in each sub-dimension). Reward-associated objects were included during learning and test (A,D,G) but are
not shown in (B–C, E–F, H–I). (J) Choice of neutral objects against aversive objects, shown separately for three sub-dimensions (n = 12 choice sessions). (K) Rate of
blinking when viewing an object during free viewing in the three sub-dimensions. Blinking increased only when gaze was directed to airpuff-associated objects.
Otherwise, the rate remained low, even when airpuff-associated objects were present, but outside gaze. **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
were included to motivate monkeys during the learning. For the
long-term training, we used a pavlovian task where continuous
gaze on the presented object was not required to enable training
with aversive outcomes (Figure 1B). Each monkey experienced
9 sets of fractals (72 objects)—3 sets for each aversive outcome
(Table 1).
Free viewing results showed that the three aversive outcomes
affected gaze preference differently (Figure 5, 6–9 sessions
per monkey). The effect of airpuff (Figures 5A–C) was
similar to the effect of reward value or reward uncertainty
(Figures 3, 4). In particular, airpuff-associated objects induced
the first saccade and within-object scanning saccades more
often than neutral objects [F(1,55) > 10]. The airpuff effects
on view duration were variable across the subjects and
did not reach significance [Figures 5B,C, F(1,55) = 2.53
p= 0.11].
In contrast, largely opposite effects were induced by
aversive taste (Figures 5D–F) and time-out (Figures 5G–I): these
objects were viewed significantly shorter than neutral objects
[F(1, 55) > 19].Within-object scanning saccades tended to be less
frequent. Overall, the time-out effects were slightly stronger and
more consistent across the subjects than the aversive taste effects
(Figures 5E–F,H–I).
We assumed that all of the aversive outcomes used in our
task were ecologically negative (i.e., monkeys disliked them),
but this assumption might not be correct, which in turn
may explain the differences in the gaze preference pattern
(Figures 5A–I). To test this possibility, we tested preference
for aversive objects using choice trials. An aversive and a
neutral object were presented simultaneously and the monkey
chose one of them resulting in an aversive or a null outcome
(thus avoiding punishment). Results showed that the three
groups of aversive objects were avoided in favor of neutral
objects almost equally (Figure 5J), suggesting that they had
roughly equal negative valences [t(22) < 0.9, p > 0.17 pairwise
comparisons].
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FIGURE 6 | Positive salience of novel objects (or, negative learned salience of familiar objects). (A–C) Effects of familiarity on fractal objects (n = 36 viewing
sessions). (D–F) Effects of familiarity on faces (n = 32). Same format as in Figures 3A–C. Before the salience test, each subject had viewed 8 fractals and 8 faces
repeatedly in >5 free viewing sessions for familiarity training. Novel fractals and faces were viewed only in one test session. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
Notably, we found an increase in eye blinking when the
monkeys looked at airpuff-associated objects during free viewing
[Figure 5K, t(29) = 3.4]. The airpuff-related blinking occurred
even though there was no outcome during free viewing. This
did not occur when monkeys looked at other groups of fractals
or other aversive objects (aversive taste, time-out, |t29| < 0.5
p > 0.7). Furthermore, the frequency of blinking for a given
airpuff-associated object was positively correlated with the rate
of first saccades to that object during free viewing (Pearson’s
r = 0.29 p= 0.02).
Negative Learned Salience for Familiar
Objects
To study the effect of mere perceptual exposure, we created
two groups of fractals: novel and familiar. Monkeys had never
observed the novel objects before salience testing (pure novelty).
Familiar objects were created by letting the monkeys view
them repeatedly (multiple free viewing sessions, >5 days) with
no outcome (long-term familiarity). For the salience test, a
set of 8 objects (4 familiar/4 novel) was presented in free
viewing (Figure 6A, example set). Overall, each monkey saw
8 familiar and 36 novel fractals in 9 free viewing sessions
(Table 1). When testing the effect of novelty, only one session
was done per day for a given familiar object (last seen >1 day
ago) to ensure equal short-term recency for familiar and novel
objects.
Free viewing results showed that gaze was biased toward novel
objects (Figures 6B,C). The effect of novelty was similar to the
effects of reward value (Figures 3B,C). Statistical difference was
present for the first saccade and within-object scanning saccades
as well view duration [Figure 6B, F(1, 67) > 6]. Overall, the
novelty effect was somewhat weaker than the reward value effect.
However, this may be due to the difference in their time courses,
as explained below.
During a free viewing session, we used the same set of 8
objects that were randomly selected and shown in 15 trials.
Thus, the same objects on average were shown 7–8 times
within one test session. During each test session for novelty,
gaze bias was initially present for all 3 metrics, but faded
by the end of the session as the objects became increasingly
familiar (Figures 7A,B). This phenomenon may be referred to
as “negative learned salience for increasingly familiar objects.” In
contrast, gaze bias for reward value remained unchanged during
free viewing (Figures 7C,D). In the early part of the test session,
gaze bias was comparable between novelty and reward value.
However, the effect of familiarity may also depend on the
intrinsic properties of objects. In particular, it is suggested that
faces may be treated differently from other geometric shapes
in novelty preference (Park et al., 2010). Therefore, we let the
monkey freely view familiar and novel faces (conspecific monkey
faces) and studied whether gaze bias was differently affected by
familiar and novel faces. Familiar faces were created using the
same free viewing procedure for familiarity in fractals. On each
trial in the salience test, a set of 8 faces (4 familiar/4 novel)
was presented for free viewing (Figure 6D, example set). Overall,
each monkey saw 8 familiar and 32 novel faces in 8 free viewing
sessions (Table 1).
Results show that gaze was attracted to novel faces in all three
metrics (Figure 6E). The effects were stronger than that of novel
fractals in viewing duration (Figure 6B). This difference is partly
caused by their different time courses: Salience declined about
three times slower for novel faces than for novel fractals (45 vs. 15
trials in Figures 8A,B,7A,B, respectively). Nonetheless, for both
novel faces and fractals, salience disappeared eventually after
repeated free viewing.
The decline of salience was unique to the novel-to-familiar
transition [ecological × trial F(2,210) > 3.5 for fractal,
F(2,184) > 4.5 for face; Figures 7, 8]. All other kinds of
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FIGURE 7 | Changes in object salience by repeated viewing with no outcome. Gaze bias was measured during each session of free viewing, and averaged
separately for the early (1–5 trials), middle (6–10 trials), and late (11–15 trials) periods. (A,B) Novel/familiar. (C,D) Low/high reward. (E,F) Certain/uncertain. (G,H)
Airpuff/neutral. (I,J) Aversive taste/neutral. (K,L) Timeout/neutral. Main effect of ecological sub-dimension and trial number as well as the interaction between the two
are marked. Post-hoc tests are marked with asterisks.
learned ecological salience we examined showed no significant
change during one test session (Figures 7C–L, interactions P
> 0.17). This is true even for 45 trial free viewing done
with an additional group of value associated fractals (72
objects: 36 high-reward, 36 low-reward, Table 1, not shown
in Figure 2; Figures 8C,D, interactions P > 0.16). We have
previously shown that learned salience of rewarding objects
remains virtually unchanged even when the test session (free
viewing with no outcome) was repeated several times or was
done many days after the long-term learning (Yasuda et al.,
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FIGURE 8 | Changes in object salience by longer repeated viewing with no outcome. Free viewing test consisted of 45 trials (instead of 15 trials, Figure 7).
(A,B) Novel/familiar faces. (C,D) Low/high reward fractals (additional 72 fractals, different from Figures 7C,D). Gaze bias for novel/familiar faces (B) declined more
slowly than for novel/familiar fractals (Figure 7B). In contrast, gaze bias for low/high reward fractals never declined (D). Main effect of ecological dimension and trial
number as well as the interaction between the two are marked. Post-hoc tests are marked with asterisks.
FIGURE 9 | Changes in novelty salience by varying its prevalence. Free viewing trials were grouped into 3 display conditions: 1-novel/3-familiar,
2-novel/2-familiar, 3-novel/1-familiar objects, and analyzed for each gaze metric. (A,B) Novel/familiar fractals. (C,D) Novel/familiar faces. In both stimulus category and
across the gaze metrics, novelty bias was observed regardless of condition (blue did not cross over red). Main effect of ecological factor and display condition as well
as the interaction between the two are marked. Post-hoc tests are marked with asterisks.
2012; Kim et al., 2015). These data indicate that novelty
salience, which declines quickly, can eventually be replaced
with other ecological dimensions of salience, which are retained
stably.
While on average, novel objects were more salient than
familiar objects, attention might be attracted to a familiar
object if it is surrounded by novel objects. To examine this
hypothesis, we analyzed free viewing data separately for three
display conditions: 1-novel/3-familiar, 2-novel/2-familiar, and
3-novel/1-familiar objects (Figure 9). We found no condition
where familiar objects were more salient than novel objects.
For the first saccade, the novelty-based salience appears to
be weaker in 3-novel/1-familiar condition with fractal objects
(Figure 9B, left). This may be explained by the salience
competition among 3 novel objects: the saccade to one novel
object would be less frequent because it is also attracted to
the other novel objects. Moreover, we found no significant
change in the first saccade to familiar objects across the
three conditions [one-way ANOVA: F(2, 105) < 2.1 fractals,
F(2, 93) < 1 faces]. These results indicate that novel objects are
more salient than familiar objects, regardless of novel object
prevalence.
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DISCUSSION
Our study demonstrates that the salience of visual objects can
change drastically after they were associated with appetitive
and aversive experiences or by mere perceptual exposure. We
conducted our experiments by using ecologically neutral objects
(fractals) instead of ecologically enriched objects (e.g., guns or
faces). The fractals were associated with particular outcomes
while monkeys viewed them repeatedly. The monkeys then
developed strong gaze biases among the fractals, thus proving
“learned salience.” We also demonstrated that there are multiple
ecological dimensions for learned salience, each affecting it
positively or negatively (Figure 10), which suggests multiple
neural mechanisms (discussed below). However, our results
do not indicate that ecological salience is always acquired by
learning. We will discuss each dimension separately below:
Positive Learned Salience for Rewarding
or Risky Objects
Previous studies on learned salience mostly focused on the
effect of reward amounts in humans (Della Libera and Chelazzi,
2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Theeuwes and Belopolsky, 2012)
and monkeys (Yamamoto et al., 2013; Hikosaka et al., 2014).
For example, task-performing human subjects are distracted by
visual stimuli more strongly if they were previously used as
target stimuli associated with highermonetary reward (Theeuwes
and Belopolsky, 2012). However, the nature of other kinds of
reward-related salience is less clear. Reward uncertainty (risk)
influences choice (i.e., choose or avoid), but it has been unclear
whether risk-associated objects attract attention automatically
(i.e., salient). Our result shows a strong gaze/attentional bias
for objects that were consistently associated with large reward
or with large reward uncertainty (Figures 3, 4). This positive
salience was also shown to be monotonically graded for objects
with graded reward amount association (Figures 3D–F). We
also saw increased salience for objects with a monotonically
increasing reward probability. However, in this case the salience
of objects with uncertain probabilities were boosted compared to
objects with equal expected reward but no reward uncertainty
(Figures 4D–F). Therefore, expected reward and uncertainty
about reward can boost object salience independently.
The positive salience of risk-associated objects in our study
was concurrent with risk seeking behavior during choice trials in
monkeys. However, risk seeking in water motivated monkeys can
be modified or even reversed (becoming risk aversion) by various
factors such as thirst level, reward magnitudes and inter-trial
interval (Hayden and Platt, 2007; Yamada et al., 2013; Stauffer
et al., 2014). Whether such changes in risk seeking affect the
learned salience of risky objects is an intriguing question that
needs to be addressed in future.
Positive Learned Salience of Threatening
Objects
Aversiveness has various features and there are various ways to
deal with it (e.g., ignore, escape, attack; Azrin et al., 1967). In
fact, we found a difference between aversive objects in the way
they engage our attention. We found that while airpuff associated
objects were attendedmore than neutral objects, the opposite was
true for aversive tastent or time-out objects (positive or negative
salience, Figures 5A–I), despite their equivalent negative valence
(Figure 5J). One possible explanation is that airpuff objects
may be more threatening than other aversive objects such as
time-out objects, which are merely unpleasant. The threatening
quality of airpuff may be related to its role in startle response
potentiation (Grillon and Ameli, 1998). We also found enhanced
blinking during viewing of airpuff objects (Figure 5K). Blinking
is known to be enhanced for threatening, but not disgusting,
visual stimuli (Balaban and Taussig, 1994) and its strength as
a conditioned response to airpuff is known to correlate with
physiological responses to threat stimuli (Runquist and Ross,
1959). On the other hand, salience of time-out objects, which
were unpleasant but not threatening, was negative. This result
is consistent with enhanced attention to threatening but not
sad faces reported in humans (Bradley et al., 2000; Sylvester
et al., 2016). However, there may be different interpretations. For
instance, airpuff generates fast sensory signals which are likely to
induce fast reactions, possibly regardless of emotional outcomes.
Further experiments are required to test such alternative
explanations.
Note that, while in the case of ecologically enriched objects
(e.g., threatening faces), the origin of positive salience (intrinsic
or learned) is not clear, our results clearly show that the
positive salience for aversive objects can be acquired through
learning: initially neutral objects became salient if the monkeys
experienced them in association with airpuff. Theeuwes and
colleagues showed that a similar learning effect of threat-induced
salience occurs in humans (Notebaert et al., 2013; Schmidt et al.,
2015). However, intrinsic salience could also exist, which remains
to be studied.
Negative Learned Salience of Familiar and
Unpleasant Objects
Our results are consistent with a common concept that novel
objects attract attention more than familiar objects (Johnston
et al., 1990; Snyder et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2009). Novel objects
attracted gaze more strongly than familiar objects using various
gaze metrics and independent of familiar objects prevalence on
the display (Figures 6, 9). Note, that in most previous studies,
familiarity is established on a relatively short time scale within
a given test session. We, on the other hand, focused on the
long-term familiarity with objects that were seen many times
over multiple days prior to testing (>5). Furthermore, our novel
objects were completely new, never before seen by the subjects.
Indeed, while we observed strong attentional bias to purely
novel objects compared with purely familiar objects on the first
saccade, the opposite pattern was observed when familiarity
was established on a shorter time scale (Snyder et al., 2008).
Novelty and familiarity can also be defined by recency of object
experience (Wilson and Rolls, 1993; Mishkin and Murray, 1994).
In this usage, novelty/familiarity depends on short term visual
memory and may engage separate neural populations (see neural
discussion). Importantly, we controlled for the effect of recency
in our experiment by (1) having novel and familiar objects
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FIGURE 10 | Multiple ecological factors influencing objects learned salience. (A) Appetitive dimension (reward amount or risk) enhances object salience.
Aversive dimension enhances or suppresses object salience depending on the outcome type. Mere perceptual exposure suppresses object salience compared to
novel objects. (B) Proposed dynamics of salience modification by ecological experience. Novel objects lose their salience through perceptual exposure (black line).
Non-threatening but unpleasant outcomes further decrease object salience compared to neutral familiar objects. Rewarding, risky, or threatening outcomes
counteract familiarity and enhance object salience.
appearing with equal probability during the free viewing test
and (2) using a familiar object only in one free viewing block
in a given day. This ensured that novel and familiar objects had
equivalent recency (short term experience) in our experiment.
Novelty-induced salience may appear different from reward-
or threat-induced salience, because novelty is not created by
learning. However, novelty is the opposite of familiarity that
is created by learning. We show that novelty-induced positive
salience is observed as the result of familiarity-induced negative
salience (Figures 7, 8), similar to a concept proposed by Zelinsky
and colleagues (Yang et al., 2009). Notably, the learning speed of
the familiarity-induced negative salience was slower when faces
(Figure 8) were presented instead of fractals (Figure 7). This
may be due to the intrinsic salience of faces counteracting the
development of negative salience due to familiarity.
Negative salience also developed for certain aversive outcomes
(Figures 5D–I). Importantly, these aversive objects were less
salient than familiar neutral objects, suggesting that the learned
negative salience is acquired by two separate mechanisms related
to familiarity and unpleasantness (Figure 10B). These negative
salience mechanisms are important, because they let us ignore
many objects that are familiar neutral or unpleasant, so that
attention is accurately directed to ecologically salient objects.
Novelty or Familiarity Preference:
Dissociating Valence and Salience
Previous studies have produced conflicting results with evidence
for both familiarity (Zajonc, 1968; Berlyne, 1970) and novelty
preference (Fantz, 1964; Johnston et al., 1990). However, studies
of familiarity preference often measured subjective valuation
(valence) of objects (Zajonc, 1968; Berlyne, 1970; Park et al.,
2010) rather than their salience (i.e., ability to attract attention).
In particular, Park et al. (2010) reported novelty preference for
geometric shapes, but familiarity preference for faces. In contrast,
we observed strong novelty salience for both fractal shapes and
faces. This suggests a dissociation between attention to and
valuation of stimuli. Such a dissociation between valence and
salience resembles the dissociability of emotions along valence-
arousal axes (Russell, 1980; Lang et al., 1993). Indeed, separability
of valence and salience can explain the positive salience of airpuff
objects during free viewing despite their negative valence.
Object Viewing and Scanning: Starting
Point of Action and Cognition
Sometimes, we need to examine an object (i.e., cognition) before
preparing for an action. This occurs while gaze is fixed on or
scanning the object (Yarbus et al., 1967; Just and Carpenter,
1976). Our data showed that more salient objects were fixated
longer and scanned more frequently, suggesting that salience
may support cognition. Encountering valuable, uncertain or
threatening objects, we may need to decide as quickly as possible
to reach, escape from, or attack them. Indeed, these objects had
high levels of salience. In contrast, it is better to ignore or make
no action to familiar but valueless objects or non-threatening
aversive (unpleasant) objects. These objects had low levels of
salience (Figure 9A).
The salience-action/cognition relationship may also apply to
the novelty-based salience. The outcome of a novel object is
uncertain and unknown. Moreover, it is unknown how variable
the outcome can be (ambiguity), unlike reward uncertainty (risk).
Therefore, we need to find the novel object quickly to get ready
for a variety of actions.
Vision, Attention, and Memory for
Ecological Salience
Our data points to important features that characterize learned
ecological salience:
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1) Peripheral vision: According to our data, ecologically salient
objects attracted the first saccade before any direct object
fixation was available. This means that fractal objects
presented in the periphery must be identified among many
others for the saccade to aim at a salient object. Without such
a mechanism, saccades would occur randomly across objects.
Thus, peripheral vision was sufficient for complex object
identification in our task despite limited visual resolution
(Loschky et al., 2005). However, it remains to be tested how
robustly our objects can be identified by peripheral vision
against changes in stimulus size, eccentricity and density
(Strasburger et al., 2011).
2) Automatic attention: During our testing procedure (i.e., free
viewing), no contingent outcomewas delivered (unlike during
the learning), yet the monkey’s attention/gaze continued to
be automatically drawn to certain objects. Several findings in
our experiment support that this gaze bias was maintained
by a passive rather than an active top-down mechanism: (1)
gaze bias toward high-reward objects was sustained with no
sign of reduction during a long session of free viewing (45
trials), even though there was no reward outcome (Figure 8),
(2) gaze was biased toward airpuff-associated objects, even
though they were avoided during choice (Figure 5), (3) gaze
bias occurred among faces (novel vs. familiar), even though
they had never been associated with rewarding or aversive
outcome (Figure 6), and (4) the bias was present in the
first saccade evoked by free viewing onset in all dimensions
tested. However, this does not exclude the possibility that
deliberate cognitive strategies (such as reward seeking) may
have contributed to gaze bias as well.
3) High capacity memory: Previous studies that have looked at
learned salience used a limited number of simple objects
(Anderson et al., 2011; Theeuwes and Belopolsky, 2012;
Schmidt et al., 2015). In our experiments, each monkey
viewed many complex objects (n = 302 appetitive, aversive
and familiar, Table 1), each of which was associated with an
ecological outcome (or no outcome), yet gaze bias occurred
differently for these objects. This means that the underlying
neural mechanism has a high capacity memory. In real life, we
are surrounded by many complex objects, yet their ecological
salience can be maintained by such high capacity memory to
orient us toward salient objects and ignore others.
Neural Mechanisms of Learned Ecological
Salience
The diversity of experiences which result in learned ecological
salience suggests different neural mechanisms might be involved.
We discuss them separately below:
Reward value
Studies from our laboratory suggest that the caudal part of
the basal ganglia underlies reward-value based salience (Yasuda
et al., 2012; Kim and Hikosaka, 2013; Yamamoto et al., 2013).
The responsible neuronal circuit is composed of: the tail of
the caudate nucleus (CDt), the caudal-dorsal-lateral part of the
substantia nigra pars reticulata (cdlSNr), and superior colliculus
(SC). In particular, SC-projecting cdlSNr neurons respond
automatically and differentially to stably high- and low-valued
objects (Yasuda et al., 2012). They have long-term memories of
object values (>100 days) with a high capacity (>300 experienced
objects). These features are completely different from the rostral
basal ganglia circuit, which does encode object values, but using
short-term memories, and contributes to deliberate rather than
automatic choice (Kim and Hikosaka, 2013). However, other
brain areas may be involved. For example, neurons in the parietal
cortex (LIP) retain their response biases based on previously
over-learned reward values (Peck et al., 2009).
Reward uncertainty (risk)
Several cortical and subcortical areas contain neurons that
encode reward uncertainty (McCoy and Platt, 2005; O’neill and
Schultz, 2010; Monosov and Hikosaka, 2013). However, these
data were obtained when the reward outcome was expected. The
salience-related responses should be present regardless of the
reward outcome, and this has not been examined. Furthermore, it
is unknown whether and how these areas can control gaze (or eye
movements) or attention. Uncertainty about outcome can also
exist in the aversive domain (aversive risk). It remains to be seen
whether and how such aversive risk influences aversive salience
and interacts with various aversive outcomes.
Aversiveness
Neurons sensitive to aversive and threatening objects are found
in many areas including the amygdala (Ledoux, 2000) and lateral
habenula (Hikosaka, 2010). Again, the data were obtained when
the outcome was expected. A feasible candidate for learned
salience is dopamine neurons. Specifically, dopamine neurons in
the dorso-lateral part of the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc)
in the monkey are excited by both rewarding and threatening
(i.e., airpuff) objects (salience-type) (Matsumoto and Hikosaka,
2009).We recently found that dopamine neurons in this region of
SNc project to CDt (Kim et al., 2014) and sustain their responses
to high-valued objects even when reward is no longer expected
(Kim et al., 2015). We hypothesize that the excitation of the
salience-type dopamine neurons facilitates the CDt-cdlSNr-SC
circuit so that gaze is attracted to both rewarding and threatening
objects. In contrast, dopamine neurons in the ventro-medial
part of SNc are excited by rewarding objects, but inhibited
by threatening objects (value-type) (Matsumoto and Hikosaka,
2009). The value-type dopamine neurons may project to the
head of the caudate nucleus (CDh; Kim et al., 2014), which
is sensitive to the immediate value outcome (Kawagoe et al.,
1998; Yasuda et al., 2012; Kim and Hikosaka, 2013; Kim et al.,
2015). The threat-induced inhibition of the value-type dopamine
neurons would suppress the CDh-circuit, so that during the
choice trials the monkey tends not to choose objects that lead
to threatening outcomes (Figure 5J). Furthermore, dopamine
neurons differentially respond to airpuff and aversive tastants
(Fiorillo et al., 2013). This may be related to the difference in
salience between different kinds of aversiveness reported in our
study.
Novelty
Neurons in many cortical and subcortical areas respond more
strongly to novel objects than to familiar objects (Knight and
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Nakada, 1998; Ranganath and Rainer, 2003). Our results show a
clear decrease in salience of novel objects by repeated exposure
(Figures 7, 8) and by long-term familiarity (Figure 6). This
might be executed simply by “habituation” for familiar objects
with which signal transmissions of visual objects are depressed
if repeated (Kemp and Manahan-Vaughan, 2004; Jutras and
Buffalo, 2010). However, in our results, we tested for long-term
effect of familiarity rather than recency. There is evidence for
shared as well as dissociable encoding of recency vs. familiarity in
the inferior temporal, perirhinal cortex. and hippocampus (Fahy
et al., 1993; Charles et al., 2004). Whether negative salience of
recent and familiar objects is mediated by the same or different
neuronal mechanisms is not currently known and needs further
investigation.
Learned Ecological Salience: A Defect or a
Basic Skill for Survival?
Positive or negative learned salience of objects can be
distracting in certain conditions (Theeuwes and Belopolsky,
2012) and may contribute to mal-adaptive behaviors such
as addiction (Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Field et al.,
2006) or anxiety disorders (Bradley et al., 2000). However,
in many situations in daily life, learned salience allows
animals and humans to robustly adapt to their particular
environment to find ecologically meaningful objects, accurately
and quickly. This is done by guiding gaze to high-salience
objects and rejecting gaze to low-salience objects. This benefit
accumulates in life because emotional experiences of all
objects are stored in a high capacity long-term memory.
Without such an object-finding skill, the animal would fail
to get rewards and avoid punishments, and may cease to
survive (Hikosaka et al., 2013).
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